California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Bad Faith for All by Karanian, Matthew E.
Masthead Logo McGeorge Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 21
1-1-1986
California Casualty General Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court: Bad Faith for All
Matthew E. Karanian
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew E. Karanian, California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Bad Faith for All, 18 Pac. L. J. 307 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/21
California Casualty General Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court: Bad Faith for All
Ideally, contract negotiations are carried out at arms-length between
parties of equal bargaining power. In practice, the variance in bargain-
ing position between insurance companies and those insured or seek-
ing an insurance policy' is frequently vast.2 This disparity,3 together
with the desire to guarantee that insurance companies promptly and
fairly act on the claims of their insureds,' has prompted many states, 5
including California, 6 to impose upon the insurer a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.7
1. An insurance policy is a contract between insurer and insured whereby, for premium
paid by insured, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured against loss, damage, or liability
arising from a contingent or unknown event. Fraser-Yamor Agency, Inc. v. Del Norte County,
68 Cal. App. 3d 201, 213, 137 Cal. Rptr. 118, 125 (1977).
2. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.03 (1984).
The agreements entered into by insurers and insureds have been labeled contracts of adhesion
because of the almost total elimination of bargaining power for the average insurance buyer.
Id. The insurance contract "is drawn up by the insurer, and the insured, who merely 'adheres'
to it, has little choice as to its terms." Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy,
33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
3. The relationship of insurer and insured has been called "inherently unbalanced." Egan
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482,
487 (1979). "[Ihe adhesive nature of insurance contracts places the insurer in a superior bargain-
ing position." Id.
4. See, e.g., Comment, Extending the Insurer's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
to Third Parties Under Liability Insurance Policies, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1413 (1978).
5. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 178 (1955).
6. See, e.g., Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958) (applied to contracts of insurance the general rule of Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.
2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949), that there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right
of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement). See also infra notes 58-72 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See, e.g., W. SHtmuors, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 1.03. The commen-
tators are persuasive in their explanation of the, need for judicial intervention:
Thus, the courts have recognized that in the relationship between the insurer and
the insured, the insurer normally has overwhelmingly superior economic power, bargain-
ing position, and semantic sophistication .... [R]ecognition of these aspects of the
relationship, along with the recognition of the importance of insurance to society
and the need to assure full performance of duties by insurance companies, is an
important part of the rationale for their imposition of tort liability on the insurer
for breach of its duty to act fairly and in good faith toward its insured. In a sense,
the imposition of such liability may be seen as an effort to equalize the parties' deal-
ings with one another and to assure that the policy holder gets the benefits he or
she bargained for.
Id. (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
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The breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, referred
to as an actionable wrong of "bad faith," 8 entitles the plaintiff to
recovery of damages in a tort or contract action. 9 Opening this avenue
for recovery in tort significantly broadened the range of remedies
available to an insured, 0 and has marked California as a trend setter
in the development of insurance law."1 Good faith and fair dealing,
however, protects insurers as well as insureds.' 2 An insurance com-
pany possibly could assert a bad faith claim against an insured in
an appropriate case, although few such decisions have been reported.' 3
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is considered
independent and absolute."' Therefore, the bad faith of one party
has not been allowed to excuse similar conduct by the other.'" The
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, however, recently
applied comparative fault principles" to bad faith insurance litiga-
tion. The court permitted an insurance company to assert the com-
8. See, e.g., Lossnio, BAD FA=rH INSURANCE LmrATION, California Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar Program Material 5, 8 (April/May 1985). The term "bad faith" is used in
this Note as a shorthand reference to a breach by the insurer or insured of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
9. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967) (action sounds in both contract and in tort, and plaintiff has freedom
of election between the causes of action); Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970) (violation by insurer of duty of good faith
and fair dealing sounds in tort notwithstanding that violation may also constitute breach of
contract). See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
10. For example, the restriction on recovery in contract claims, based on the rule in Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 345-53 (1854), that the damages must have been reasonably forseeable
to the parties at the time the contract was made, is removed. Additionally, punitive damages,
which traditionally are not available in contract actions, may be awarded to the insured in
an appropriate case. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Comment, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of
Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CL4RA L. REV. 917 (1983) (California courts have
been the pace-setters in the development of insurance law). See also Comment, A Statutory
Action for Insurer Bad Faith-The Reasonably Clear Remedy for the Third Party Claimant,
11 PAC. L.J. 945 (1980) (California an acknowledged leader in crusade to increase consumer
protection in insurance dealings).
12. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 797, 139
Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (1977) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing devolves alike upon the in-
sured as well as the insurer); Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26
Cal. 3d 912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980) (good faith and fair
dealing is a "two-way street"); See also infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text (there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party do anything to injure the right of
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement).
14. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 488 (1973); see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
16. Under comparative fault or comparative negligence doctrines, negligence is measured
as a percentage, and any damages allowed are diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the plaintiff. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1975).
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parative bad faith of an insured who had filed a bad faith claim against
the company as an affirmative defense.' 7 Writing for a unanimous
court in California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court
of San Bernadino County, 8 Justice Marcus Kaufman stated that the
court could conceive of no sound reason for the doctrine of com-
parative fault to be inapplicable in bad faith cases.' 9 California Casu-
alty is the first appellate court decision to expressly sanction com-
parative bad faith as a defense in insurance bad faith litigation.20
Part I of this Note sets forth the facts and decision of California
Casualty.2' Part II will discuss the historical and legal background





Paula Gorgei obtained an automobile insurance policy from Califor-
nia Casualty General Insurance Company which included a provision
for uninsured motorist coverage. 24 This coverage is designed to per-
mit an insured to recover directly from his or her insurer those damages
that the insured would be legally entitled to recover from the owner
or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle. 25 Gorgei was in a car
crash on December 2, 1981, in which she claimed to have suffered
17. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 283, 218
Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (1985).
18. 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985).
19. Id. at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
20. See Court OK's Comparative Bad Faith as a Defense, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at
10, col. 1. The only case prior to California Casualty to discuss comparative bad faith did
not signify judicial approval or recognition of the defense. Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160
Cal. App. 3d 31, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1984). In Fleming, the defense was presented and deter-
mined by stipulation. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 281 n.2, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.2.
21. See infra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 49-133 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
24. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 276, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818. The California
Insurance Code requires that any policy of automobile liability insurance include coverage against
bodily injury or wrongful death for which the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehi-
cle would be responsible. CAL. INs. CODE § I1580.2(a)(1). The code provides in part that:
No policy of bodily injury liability insurance covering liability arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, . . . shall be issued or delivered
in this state to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, . . . unless the policy
contains [coverage] for all sums within such limits which [the insured] shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury or wrongful death from the owner
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
Id.
25. CAL. INs. CODE § 11580.2(a)(1). The Insurance Code also requires underinsured motorist
coverage. Id. § 11580.2(n).
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injuries covered by the uninsured motorist provisions of her policy
with California Casualty. 26 Gorgei filed a claim, but the insurance
company refused to pay more than $10,000, prompting Gorgei's at-
torney to pursue the matter in arbitration in May 1982.27 After ten
months, the arbitrator determined that Gorgei's claim was worth
$15,000.28 Gorgei then brought a bad faith suit against California
Casualty seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. 29 The suit
alleged that the insurer failed to reasonably and promptly investigate
and process her claim, failed to exercise good faith in seeking a prompt,
fair, and equitable settlement, and wrongfully withheld payment on
her claim, notwithstanding the knowledge that plaintiff was entitled
to recovery.3" Gorgei alleged that these acts by California Casualty
amounted to a breach of the insurer's duty of good faith and fair
dealing as well as a breach of statutory duties under the Unfair Prac-
tices Act3 of the California Insurance Code. The insurance company
answered with three affirmative defenses: alleging the negligence of
Gorgei; requesting an allocation of damages against other negligent
26. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 276, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
27. Court OK's Comparative Bad Faith, supra note 20, at 10, col. 1.
28. Id.
29. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 276-77, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
30. Id.
31. The Unfair Practices Act of the California Insurance Code, §§ 790-790.10, provides
that insurers may not engage in any practice which the article defines as an unfair method
of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. CAL.
INs. CODE § 790.02. As written, the Unfair Practices Act does not expressly permit a private
cause of action by those injured by violations of the act, but rather, provides for enforcement
by the Insurance Commissioner. See id. § 790.05. The right to a private cause of action has
been implied from the provisions of the statute, however. The court in Greenberg v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973),
for example, held that enforcement of California Insurance Code § 790.03, which lists pro-
hibited acts and practices, was not vested exclusively in the Insurance Commissioner. Id. at
1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. See also Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975) (Insurance Commissioner's jurisdiction to restrain insurance company's
wrongful practices is primary, but not exclusive). The California Supreme Court expressly held
in Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 885-90, 592 P.2d 329,
332-35, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845-48 (1979), that a violation of the unfair claims settlement prac-
tices provisions of § 790.03(h) gave rise to a private civil cause of action for money damages.
Approval by Royal Globe of the use of private civil claims against insurers based on statutory
violations put some bite into the statute and may have been encouraged by the inadequacy
of self-policing efforts by the insurance industry. Shortly before the decision in Royal Globe,
the California legislature received a report on the inadequacy of attempts by the insurance
industry at self regulation. See Shernoff & Levine, The Evolution of Insurance Bad Faith Ac-
tions: Emerging Damages Issues, 16 CAL. TRuL LAW. A.J. 131, 142 (1977). The report stated
in part that:
[t]he Department of Insurance's organization and procedures for investigating and
resolving public complaints against insurance companies and agents are seriously defi-
cient. Little effort is made to investigate overall patterns of complaints about in-
surers' business practices upon which serious discipline might be based. Although
the Department more effectively addresses public complaints against insurance agents,
1986 / California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct.
parties; and alleging that Gorgei's action was frivolous and had not
been brought in good faith.
32
While the California Casualty case was still pending, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal for the Second District decided a bad faith in-
surance case33 which referred to comparative bad faith. This reference
34
prompted California Casualty to urge that Gorgei stipulate to a fourth
affirmative defense which would permit any damages against the com-
pany to be reduced by the alleged bad faith of the plaintiff and her
lawyers. The company contended that Gorgei and her counsel had
used dilatory tactics, including not promptly forwarding a doctor's
report and delaying in seeking arbitration.33 Gorgei refused to stipulate
to the proposal.3 6 The defendants then filed a motion with the trial
court seeking leave to amend their answer to add this defense. The
trial court denied the insurer's motion, without explanation.3 7 Califor-
nia Casualty sought review of this ruling in the California Court of
Appeal for the Fourth District.
B. The Decision
In a unanimous opinion by a three judge panel, 3 the California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reversed the ruling of the
[there is an] inadequate management of the investigations and unnecessary backlog
of work. The Department's fragmented organization of investigative and disciplinary
functions and a lack of uniform procedures compound these problems.
Id. at 143 (citing Joint Legislative Audit Committee, REPORT TO Tim CALiFoRNiA LEoIS.ATURE:
Ravraw oF THE Disc'mARY FuNcnoNs oF THE DEPAxr1mr oF INsuRANcE, Summary, 1 (1977)).
Some commentators believe the Royal Globe decision has encouraged insurance carriers to set-
tle claims more promptly and fairly. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee, Apr. 6, 1986, (A Special Report:
The Bird Court), at 4, col. 2. "You get in an accident on the way home, and you'll get a
call from your insurance adjuster tonight." Id.
32. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 277, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
33. Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 31, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1984). In Flem-
ing, the parties had stipulated to a set-off for the insured's bad faith. Court OK's Comparative
Bad Faith, supra note 20, at 10, col. 1. Although the decision of the court did not recognize
comparative bad faith on the part of the insured as a valid theory, the issue was specifically
reserved. Fleming, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 45, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (the court saw no need
to determine the "propriety" of comparing bad faith of the insured with bad faith of the
insurance company).
34. The reference in Fleming to comparative bad faith gave "public recognition" to this
idea for the first time. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
35. Court OK's Comparative Bad Faith, supra note 20, at 10, col. 1.
36. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 277, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19.
37. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 819. Although the
minute order issued by the trial court which denied the motion to amend did not state any
particular ground for the ruling, the trial judge stated at the hearing on the motion that he
believed the proposed amendment failed to state a defense. "I am inclined to think if it is
subject to demurrer that I should deny the motion just to avoid multiplicity of court appearances,
if nothing else." California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
38. Justices McDaniel and Morris concurred in the opinion by Justice Kaufman.
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trial court in California Casualty." The court ruled that the denial
of defendant's motion to amend to include comparative bad faith
as an affirmative defense was an abuse of judicial discretion by the
trial court."0 The court of appeal ordered the issuance of a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to vacate the order and to enter
a new order granting the motion.' Plaintiff Gorgei contended that
no authority recognized "comparative bad faith" as a defense to an
action for bad faith, and that since the proposed defense of Califor-
nia Casualty was not legally recognized, the defense was
"disfavored. 41 2 The court in California Casualty rejected this argu-
ment. According to the court, the absence of judicial recognition of
comparative bad faith made the defense novel, but not necessarily
disfavored. Defenses are disfavored not for being novel, but rather,
for public policy reasons., 3 The California Casualty court was per-
suaded that no policy reason precluded the assertion of comparative
bad faith at least as a partial defense to either an insured's action
for damages against an insurer for the insurer's breach of any statutory
duties under the Unfair Practices Act," or for the insurer's breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing." Therefore, the court
applied the doctrine of comparative fault 46 to this bad faith case.
47
Although the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises out of the
contractual relationship of the parties, breach of the duty is nonetheless
governed by tort principles, thereby justifying the comparative fault
analogy. 8
39. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 280, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
43. Id. at 281, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
44. The statutory duties owed the insured by an insurer are identified by negative implica-
tion in § 790.03(h) of the California Insurance Code, in which the following procedures are
proscribed: "(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices: . . . (5) Not
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which
liability has become reasonably clear." CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h).
45. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
46. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(negligence is measured as a percentage, with the proportionate negligence of the plaintiff reducing
the damages recoverable from the defendant).
47. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823. The doctrine
of comparative fault has been applied between two negligent actors, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), between a strictly liable defendant
and a negligent plaintiff, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), between a tortfeasor whose liability is based on strict products liability
and a tortfeasor whose liability is based on negligence, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21
Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978), and between a negligent and an inten-
tional tortfeasor Sorensen v. Alired, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980).
48. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 283-84, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Bad Faith of the Liability Insurer
The relationship between the purchaser of a policy of insurance
and the insurer is contractual in nature, and the rights of the parties
have traditionally been enforced purely as contractual obligations.4 9
As the courts have long recognized, 0 however, contracts for insurance
do not reflect the traditional ideal of freedom of contract. Insurance
companies operate from a position of superior bargaining power
5'
which allows the insured little choice beyond the terms already drafted
by the insurer.5 2 The special relationship 3 that exists between insurer
and insured, and the public trust with which insurers are endowed,
5 4
contribute to the willingness of the courts to intervene in insurance
contracts.
Rather than force an insured to rely upon traditional contract
remedies, which may be wholly inadequate," courts have tended to
require that the insurer render the "basic protection" impliedly pro-
49. See Note, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co., 25 HAsTINGs L.J. 699 (1974).
50. The California Supreme Court in 1910 tacitly recognized the insurance policy as an
adhesion contract. Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 P. 292 (1910).
The court wrote: "It must be presumed, ordinarily, that persons are familiar with the terms
of written contracts to which they are parties, and in the absence of fraud they are justly
bound by the provisions therein, but the rule should not be strictly applied to insurance policies."
Id. at 230, 107 P. at 298 (emphasis added).
51. E. PaESoN, ESSENTIAIS OF INSURANCE LAW § 1, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1957).
52. R. KETON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a), at 350 (1971). The superior bargain-
ing power of the insurer is caused by several factors: "[t]he inability of most insureds to under-
stand the technical nature of an insurance contract, the various conditions of governmental
regulations afforded such contracts, the economic necessity of mass production and sales of
contracts of insurance, and the characteristic disparity in financial backing between the par-
ties." See PATTERSON, supra note 51, § 1, at 3. As a result, insurance contracts are usually
contracts of adhesion which place the insureds in inferior bargaining positions. See, e.g., Healy
Tibbits Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 741, 749, 140
Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (1977).
53. A nineteenth century court, in one of the earliest cases to recognize the special rela-
tionship between the parties, explained that the relationship was built on mutual confidence,
and reasoned that a spirit of good faith and fair dealing between the parties should mark
every insurance contract. Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig, 80 Ky. 223, 235 (1882).
54. Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New In-
dustrial State, 55 CALF. L. REv. 1247, 1265 (1965). See also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979). The Egan court
wrote that the obligations of an insurer are rooted in their status "as purveyors of a vital
service labeled quasi public in nature." Id. "Insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries, and
with the public's trust must go private responsibilities consonant with that trust." Id.
55. Contract law principles have historically precluded many insureds from recovering
damages as a result of tortious breaches of insurance contracts. Levine, Demonstrating and
Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F.L.
REv. 613, 616 (1979). See Christensen v. Slaughter, 173 Cal. App. 2d 325, 343 P.2d 341 (1959);
California Press Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Packing Co., 192 Cal. 479, 221 P. 345 (1923); Overstreet
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mised to the insured. 6 The California judiciary has promoted parity
in the relationship between insurer and insured through the applica-
tion of tort principles. 7 Beginning with the premise that all contracts
for insurance contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, 8 the California Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case Com-
unale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 9 that an insurer who
unreasonably refuses to settle a liability claim brought against an in-
sured by a third party, is liable for the full amount of the harm caused
the insured." This protection of the insured is acutely necessary in
third party cases 6' because of the inherent risk of excess liability the
insured faces when an insurer refuses to settle a liability claim within
policy limits.
The nature of this risk was recognized by the California Supreme
Court in Comunale. In Comunale, the insured was covered under a
liability policy with a $10,000 policy limit for each person injured
and a $20,000 maximum payment for each accident. 62 While operating
a truck, the insured struck two pedestrians, one of whom suffered
serious injuries. 63 The insurance company was notified of the acci-
dent, but denied coverage and refused to accept an offer to settle
the claim within policy limits for $4,000.64 The insured was finan-
cially unable to settle without the support of the insurance carrier,
and so was forced to defend against the claim in court.63
The injured pedestrians, Mr. and Mrs. Comunale, prevailed, and
the more severely injured Mr. Comunale was awarded $25,000.66 The
insured assigned all of his rights against their insurance carrier, Traders
v. Merrit, 186 Cal. 494, 200 P. 11 (1921); Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150
Cal. 51, 87 P. 1093 (1906); see also Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (only
those damages reasonably forseeable to the parties at the time of forming of contract may
be recovered).
56. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 280, 419 P.2d 168, 179, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
115 (1966).
57. See, e.g., W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 1.03 (the imposition
of tort liability is an effort to equalize the parties' dealings with one another).
58. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949). The cove-
nant provides that "neither party will do anything which injures the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement." Id.
59. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
60. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
61. In third party or liability coverage cases, the insured is faced with a claim by a third
party and seeks indemnity from his or her insurer for the claim. W. SHERNOIF, S. GAGS &
H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 3.01. First party insurance, by contrast, involves an insured who
seeks direct coverage from the insurer for losses covered by the policy. Id.
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& General Insurance Company, to the Comunales, who sued for the
amount in excess of the policy coverage. The court ruled in favor
of the Comunales, and held that when the risk of recovery beyond
the policy limit is great, so that the claim would most reasonably
be disposed of by settling within those limits, a good faith considera-
tion of the interest of the insured requires the insurer to settle the
claim.67 Failure to settle under these circumstances was held to be
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.68
This decision marked the first time this duty was applied to insurers
by the California Supreme Court.69
In the absence of the rule permitting recovery of excess liability
in third party insurance coverage cases, an insurer would have little
to lose by refusing to settle any case in which claimed liability is at
or near the policy limits. If the insurer could lose no more than the
policy limit on any given liability claim, the insurer would have little
reason to refrain from gambling with the insured's money and taking
every case to trial.70 Virtually all jurisdictions recognize this tempta-
tion, and hold the insurer liable for excess judgments against an in-
sured when the insurer has in bad faith, failed to settle a third party
claim within the policy limits.7 '
Excess liability for failure to settle third party claims against the
insured will not be imposed on the insurer in every case, however."
The insurer need only exercise good faith and fair dealing when
deciding whether to accept a settlement offer. As explained by the
California Supreme Court, the test for determining whether the in-
surer has met this standard is whether a prudent insurer without policy
limits would have accepted the offer.73 Although some commentators
have suggested that an insurer be held strictly liable for the excess
judgment if the insurer refuses to settle within policy limits,74 no
67. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
68. Id.
69. W. SHERNorF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 1.07(2). An appellate court
one year earlier had allowed an excess judgment suit against an insurer, on similar grounds.
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689-90, 319 P.2d 69, 75-76 (1957).
70. Court costs would likely deter litigation only in exceptionally small cases. Attorney
fees generally exceed court costs, but may represent a fixed annual expense for larger insurance
companies, and would therefore be a minimal deterrent to litigation.
71. W. SHi-RNOF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 3.03(1)(a).
72. See, e.g., Hodges v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1961) (no bad faith in the absence of an overt conflict of interest between insured and insurer).
73. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 16 (1967).
74. See, e.g., Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L.
REV. 1136, 1137 (1954); Comment, In California Excess Liability Cases, Does "Bad Faith"
in Law Equal "Strict Liability" in Practice?, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 115, 143-45 (1977).
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jurisdiction has accepted this proposition.7"
Recovery by the insured or by a person who has received an assign-
ment of rights from the insured is not limited to the amount of the
excess judgment, because breach of the duty to settle constitutes bad
faith and is a tort.7" The insurer is liable for all damages proximately
caused to those who are owed the duty." In Crisci v. Security In-
surance Co.,7" for example, the court upheld an award for mental
distress suffered by the insured after the insurer refused to settle a
third party's tort claim within policy limits."' Punitive damages may
also be awarded in an appropriate case, although few courts have
awarded exemplary damages in excess judgment cases."0
75. The court in Crisci considered the issue of strict liability and characterized the pro-
posed rule as "a simple one to apply [which] avoids the burden of a determination whether
a settlement offer within the policy limits was reasonable." Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426
P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. Crisci did not need to decide the issue to find liability,
however, and therefore sidestepped the issue. Id. The California Supreme Court again reviewed
the argument for strict liability in Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau,
15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). The court left the matter undecided
because the "defendant's liability for the excess judgment may be predicated on its rejection
of a reasonable settlement offer." Johansen, 15 Cal. 3d at 17 n.6, 538 P.2d at 749 n.6, 123
Cal. Rptr. at 293 n.6. Although strict liability in a situation like that in Crisci would eliminate
gambling with the insured's policy benefits, no court outside California has adopted strict liability
either. W. YOUNG, E. HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE, 381 (2d ed. 1985). The
New Jersey Supreme Court considered adopting a strict liability rule in Rova Farms Resort,
Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495 (1974), but the court later ruled that Rova
Farms had not eliminated "bad faith" as requisite to establishing liability. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (rejecting
the contention that the action for wrongful refusal to settle sounds solely in contract); Com-
unale, 50 Cal. 2d at 663, 328 P.2d at 203 (acknowledging that wrongful refusal to settle has
generally been treated as a tort).
77. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1418.
78. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
79. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 432-34, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
80. W. Si aNmoi, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 3.07(5). An award of punitive
damages in a third party liability case was upheld, however, in Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100
Cal. App. 3d 739, 758, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 332-33 (1980). The California Court of Appeal
for the First District explained in Miller that more than bad faith must exist before a punitive
award can be made against an insurer. Miller, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 758-59, 161 Cal. Rptr.
at 332-33. An act which constitutes fraud, malice, or oppression must also exist. See CAL.
CIv. CODE § 3294. The Civil Code provides that "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation
not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant." Id. § 3294(a). A bad faith failure to settle a third
party claim does not necessarily include these components. Miller, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 759,
161 Cal. Rptr. at 333. Miller noted that oppression in this context has been defined as a con-
scious disregard of the insured's rights by the insurer. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., II
Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974). See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(c)(2) (defining oppression as subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in con-
scious disregard of that person's rights). The court found oppression present in the conduct
of the Elite Insurance Company. Miller, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 758-59, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
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B. Insurer Bad Faith in First Party Litigation
Judicial recognition of the tort of bad faith in the first party
casualty insurance context"1 has not been as pervasive as the accep-
tance of the tort theory when the insured is being sued by a third
party for conduct covered by an insurance policy.82 This reluctance
appears to have been the result of the different considerations that
apply in first party insurance relationships when the insurer is liable
directly to the insured. In first party insurance coverage, no conflict
of interest exists, unlike the situation arising from third party cases
in which the insurer might be tempted to gamble with the insured's
money.8" If the insurer fails to pay the claim of the insured, the in-
sured's contractual remedy for breach of the duty to pay the claim
is generally adequate protection. In addition, the potential for injury
resulting from the denial of first party claims is small compared to
the damages likely to be incurred when a third party obtains an ex-
cess liability verdict against the insured84 after the insurance company
has refused to settle.
In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,85 a California
appellate court nevertheless rejected these arguments against extend-
ing bad faith tort liability to first party insurers, primarily because
of the presumed superior bargaining power of the insurer.8 6 Fletcher
held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires a disability
insurer not to withhold payments maliciously or without probable
cause.8 7 Breach of the duty sounds in tort as well as in contract,88
81. First party coverage refers to the type of insurance coverage under which the insurer
contracts to pay benefits directly to the insured. W. SHEa8Ior, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra
note 2, § 5.02. First party coverage includes life insurance, health and accident insurance, disability
insurance, title insurance, property damage insurance, fire insurance, medical payments coverage,
and other types of policies providing for payments to be made directly to the insured. Id.
82. See 16A APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8878.15, at 424 (1981). Many
courts have failed to protect insureds adequately because they have limited themselves to ac-
tions for breach of contract. Id. Courts in a few jurisdictions have expressed disfavor toward
the imposition of bad faith tort liability on first party insurers. See, e.g., Santilli v. State Farm
Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d 965, 969-70 (Or. 1977) (the Supreme Court of Oregon noted that the
unique relationship that gives rise to the special duty of liability insurers to settle within policy
limits does not arise in cases involving an insurer's duty to pay an insured for a casualty).
83. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1422.
84. See Comment, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13
PAC. L.J. 833, 837 (1982).
85. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
86. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1415. In the casualty insurance context, the insured
is often in such severe financial straits that he is quite vulnerable to a coerced and unreasonably
low settlement demand. Id.
87. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
88. Id.
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and can support an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.8 9
The California Supreme Court disspelled any doubts about the duty
owing in first party cases three years later with the decision in
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co..9 The court ruled that in every
insurance contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is im-
plied.9' The covenant of good faith is immanent in the contract whether
the company is attending to the claims of the insured or to the claims
of third persons against the insured. 92 Accordingly, an insurer who
unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of
its insured is subject to liability in tort.93 Since Gruenberg, an in-
surer's liability for bad faith has not been restricted to cases in which
the insurer has unreasonably withheld payment on an insured's claim.
Liability has also attached when the insurer has failed to make a proper
investigation before denying the claim9" and when the insurer used
fraudulent or deceptive practices in the course of the investigation
of the insured's claim. 95
The California courts have adopted a similar approach in unin-
sured motorist insurance cases, 96 analyzing uninsured motorist provi-
sions as a type of first party coverage. An appellate court applied
89. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. A lack of clarity in Fletcher regarding the con-
duct that would be needed for an insurer to breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing
clouded later interpretation of the decision. See Note, supra note 49, at 704.
90. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
91. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 817, 598 P.2d 452, 455-56, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 485-86 (1979).
95. See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 659-60, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 269, 272 (1973); Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 627-28, 498 P.2d 1063,
1071, 102 Cal. Rptr 815, 823 (1972). Although other jurisdictions have followed the California
approach to first party bad faith, the decisions of the California courts have not been univer-
sally accepted. Kottke, Plugging the Cracks: The Basis and Extent of Liability for First Party
Bad Faith Claims, 32 FED'W INS. CoUNs. Q. 79, 93 (1981).
96. See generally Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 389 (1978) (recognizing cause of action against insurer for bad faith failure to pay unin-
sured motorist benefits to insured); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App.
3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (tortious breach of contract for an insurer to in bad faith
withhold payment of uninsured motorist benefits to an insured, when insurer knew claim to
be valid). From an analytical standpoint, uninsured motorist coverage is a type of first party
insurance. W. SHERNoF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 4.01. At least one commen-
tator would apply third party bad faith doctrine to uninsured motorist insurance, however:
Assume motorist A has uninsured motorist coverage with the common $15,000 per
person injury limit and motorist B does not. Motorist B causes an automobile acci-
dent, involving motorist A. Motorist A is not at fault, but the costs of his injury
are well beyond the uninsured motorist limits of $15,000. Although A will now be
making a claim against his own insurance company, the bad faith doctrine is still
applicable. If that insurance company acts in bad faith toward A, it should be liable
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the Fletcher standard of good faith and fair dealing to an uninsured
motorist claim in Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,"
and imposed tort liability upon the insurer for unreasonably refusing
to pay the claim of the insured. 9 In Richardson, the insurance car-
rier refused to pay the claim of an insured under an uninsured motorist
provision for months after the company knew the claim was valid. 99
The insurance company forced the plaintiff into an arbitration hear-
ing despite the knowledge that the company had no defense and then
compelled the plaintiff to resort to litigation to have the arbitration
award judicially confirmed.' 0 The court ruled that this conduct was
unconscionable and amounted to a tortious breach of contract.'1
0
The California Supreme Court ruled on the standard of liability
in uninsured motorist cases for the first time in Neal v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange.'12 Neal reaffirmed the premise of Richardson, later
articulated in Gruenberg, that an insurer has a duty not to
unreasonably withhold payments due under a policy, 03 and treated
uninsured motorist coverage as just another type of first party in-
surance.'0 The Neal court reiterated an earlier ruling'05 that an in-
surer has a duty to act fairly and in good faith when handling claims
submitted by an insured as well as when responding to claims made
against an insured.' 6 Mrs. Frances Neal had filed for benefits under
the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy which she
had obtained from Farmers Insurance Exchange. Farmers Insurance
had refused to pay Mrs. Neal's claim in full, despite knowing there
was "no colorable defense" to her claim.' 7 The court held that this
for the damages which exceed the policy limits. After all, this is just another claim
by an accident victim against an insurance carrier.
Hills & Pivnicka, Development and Direction of the California Bad Faith Doctrine or "0 Ye
of Little Faith," 8 U.S.F.L. Ray. 29, 46-47 (1973) (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
97. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
98. Id. at 239, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The approach of the court in imposing liability for an unreasonable failure to
pay claims is the same approach as is used in other first party coverage cases. In the third
party situation, tort liability is imposed for unreasonable failure to settle within policy limits. Id.
102. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
103. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
104. See W. SHmPRoi', S. GAGE & H. LvmirE, supra note 2, § 4.03(2). A later appellate
court decision premised the bad faith liability of an insurer in an uninsured motorist coverage
case on the insurer's handling of the issuance of the policy itself, as well as the handling of
a subsequent claim. See Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 664-65, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 843, 857-58 (1979) (insurer fraudulently induced policy holders to waive their uninsured
motorist coverage).
105. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
106. See Neal, 21 Cal. 3d at 920, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
107. Id. at 921, 582 P.2d at 985-86, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
failure was a breach of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith with
an insured.'08
C. Bad Faith of the Insured
The extent to which an insured may be liable to an insurer for
a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing has been the
subject of controversy and uncertainty.' 9 The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing found in every contract requires that neither
party do anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits
of the agreement." 0 This principle has been held applicable to policies
of insurance."' Nevertheless, the liability of an insured from the breach
of this covenant appears significantly less grave than that which would
be incurred by an insurance company for a like breach, ' 2 since the
damages incurred by the insurance company are likely to be less than
those incurred by the insured." 3
A breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to an
insurer may arise when the insured contracts with third parties. In
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Altfilisch Construction Co., 1 4
the insured leased equipment to a third party and, without consulting
the insurer, agreed to hold the third party harmless for any damage
to the equipment. '" This agreement cut off the insurer's right of
subrogation," 6 precluding the insurer from recovery after the third
party negligently damaged the equipment. The court held that given
the insurer's expectation of the right of subrogation against any
negligent third party in the event of a loss suffered by the insured,
the insured had acted in bad faith when contracting away that right."
108. Id.
109. See generally Note, Insurance Settlements; An Insured's Bad Faith, 31 DRAKE L. REV.
877 (1981-1982) (the bad faith of an insured should be determined by the same analysis used
to determine whether an insurance company has acted in bad faith).
110. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
111. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
112. See generally Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789,
139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been the source
of "spectacular jury awards" against insurance companies).
113. The insured, having already suffered a loss, is burdened further by a bad faith delay
in settlement by the insurance company. The insurer, in contrast, benefits by any delay in
payment since the insurance company retains assets for a longer period.
114. 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977).
115. Id. at 793-94, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93.
116. Subrogation is the lawful substitution of a third party in place of a party having a
claim against another party. BLACK's LAw DI TioNARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979). Insurance com-
panies generally have the right to step into the shoes of the party whom they compensate and
sue any party whom the compensated party could have sued. Id.
117. Altfillisch, 70 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
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Despite the use of "bad faith" language by the court, however, the
breach by the insured was not treated as a tort."18 Recovery by the
insurer was limited by the measure of traditional contract damages,
and the Liberty Mutual court described the insured's breach as hav-
ing the same legal consequences as any "garden variety" breach of
contract." 9
Perhaps a more compelling illustration of the desirability of holding
the insured to the same good faith and fair dealing standard as the
insurance carrier exists in the context of large-scale liability insurance
litigation. Suppose, for example, that M, a manufacturer of widgets,
has a liability insurance policy with X, covering losses up to one million
dollars, with a $250,000 deductible. Suppose further that a third par-
ty, when using one of M's widgets, is seriously injured and sues M
for $500,000. After X has conducted an investigation of the accident,
X concludes that the risk of a verdict in excess of the amount of
M's deductible is substantial, and enters into negotiations with the
claimant in an effort to settle the claim. The claimant agrees to settle
for $100,000, but M, proud of his widgets, refuses to settle the lawsuit.
The parties go to trial and the claimant is awarded $500,000. Because
of the refusal of the insured to settle, the insurance carrier is liable
for a $250,000 judgment that the carrier would not have had to pay
if M had accepted the settlement. 2 ' If the roles of the parties had
been reversed, the liability of the insurer for the amount of the ex-
cess judgment would have been clear, based on the California Supreme
Court holdings in Comunale, Crisci, and Johansen.2 '
Although no California court has directly addressed the issue of
liability for bad faith failure to settle by an insured, a few cases have
presented similar issues. In Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp.,'22
a liability insurance policy had provided that the insurer could not
settle any claim without the written consent of the insured,'23 and
the insured did not consent in writing to a proposed settlement.
Holding that the settlement clause did not permit an insured to
unreasonably reject a settlement offer,'24 the court noted that the
118. The breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing sounds in both contract and
in tort. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 18 (1967).
119. Alfifiisch, 70 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
120. See W. YoUNG & E. HoLues, CASES AND MATERIAS ON INSURANCE 387 (2d ed. 1985).
121. See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
122. 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
123. Id. at 129 n.1, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.l.
124. Id. at 136, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
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unreasonable refusal of the insured to accept a settlement had con-
tributed to the verdict against the excess insurer.' 25
The California Supreme Court, in another case brought by an ex-
cess insurer'2 6 against the insured and the insured's primary insurance
carrier,"' said that status as an insured is not a license to subvert
the legitimate rights and expectations of an excess insurance carrier.
2 8
The court nevertheless ruled that the insured's covenant of good faith
and fair dealing did not impose upon the insured a duty that is com-
mensurate with the duty owed an insured by the primary insurer.2 9
An insured contemplating settlement, therefore, need not place the
excess carrier's financial interests on an equal footing with the in-
sured's own.'30
Commentators disagree as to the desirability of allowing insurers
a cause of action in tort against insureds when the insured breaches
a duty of good faith and fair dealing.' 3' Courts have made clear,
however, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is absolute and
independent, and that the bad faith of an insurer will not be excused
by the failure of the other party to perform contractual obligations.' 2
The independence of bad faith claims is consistent with the logic of
the California courts that prompted rejection of contributory negligence
as an absolute bar to recovery in a negligence action.'33 Since both
the insurer and the insured may assert bad faith causes of action against
each other, the decision of California Casualty permitting comparative
bad faith to be pleaded as an affirmative defense is nothing more
than an extension of comparative fault principles. This extension is
a logical refinement of bad faith doctrine.
125. Id. at 136-37, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
126. A policy of excess insurance is one that provides that the insurer is liable only for
the excess above and beyond that which may be collected on other insurance. BLACK's LAW
DicoNARY 505 (5th ed. 1979).
127. Commercial Union Ass. Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038,
164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
128. Id. at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Note, supra note 109, at 896 (insurers should be able to protect themselves
and be allowed to recover damages they may suffer when the insured acts in bad faith); W.
SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 2, § 2.03(3)(a) (the considerations that have led
the courts to impose tort liability on the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith do not
apply to the insured).
132. See Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
133. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 458
(1975).
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III. LEGAL RAMFICATIONS
The decision in California Casualty permitting an insurance carrier
to plead comparative bad faith as a defense to a bad faith claim by
an insured is without precedent'34 and is a milestone in the develop-
ment of bad faith doctrine in California. Considering the history of
comparative fault principles in California, however, the decision should
not have been unexpected. Comparative fault among negligent tort-
feasors was adopted by the California Supreme Court more than ten
years ago'35 and since that time has been applied to an increasingly
broad array of tortfeasors.136 Comparative bad faith follows logically
from the comparative fault doctrine.'37 This progressive refinement
of bad faith doctrine, however, may amount to a judicial retreat from
previous efforts to strengthen the bargaining positions of insureds
relative to insurers.
Imposing the duty of good faith and fair dealing upon insurers
has had the effect of elevating the bargaining position of the insured.'
3
1
In casualty or uninsured motorist cases, insureds are able to reject
low claim settlement offers. Thus, prompt performance by the in-
surance carriers is encouraged. 39 The message to insurers has been
simple: give careful consideration to the financial and emotional in-
terests of the insured.'4 0 Comparative bad faith, however, may have
134. See California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 281, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (acknowledg-
ing that comparative bad faith had not been recognized in any published appellate decision
as a partial or complete defense to bad faith). See also Fleming, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 31,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (noting that comparing the bad faith of the parties appears to have
no precedent in bad faith insurance litigation, but leaving the propriety of such a comparison
undecided, since the issue had not been raised); Court OK's Comparative Bad Faith, supra
note 20, at 10, col. I (the California Casualty decision is believed to mark the first time an
appellate court has stated explicitly that comparative bad faith is a valid defense).
135. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
136. See supra note 47 and cases cited therein. In 1980 an appellate court identified a trend
in the decisions of the California Supreme Court that pointed toward the adoption of an ap-
portionment of the fault doctrine, without regard for the nature of the alleged operative negligence
or other basis for liability in a particular case. See Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717,
723, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980).
137. California Casualty, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
138. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1423.
139. Id. at 1423-24.
140. Hilts, Insurers' Refusal to Settle Claims: Intentional Creation of Distress, 23 DEF.
L.J. 335, 351 (1974). The increased bargaining strength of insureds, stemming from the ap-
plication of a theory of recovery in tort, rather than just contract, against an insurer is reflected
in the following advice to insurers:
First, conduct a thorough investigation and develop all the facts relating to the damages.
Second, ascertain the nature of such facts prior to declining any claim. Third, if
there are any doubts, resolve the doubts in the favor of an insured. Finally, make
all payments of losses as promptly as possible.
Raymont, Punitive Damages and Property Claims, 76 BEsT's REv. 32-33 (1975).
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muzzled the theory that led to this heightened sense of concern' 4 ' by
insurers. The California Casualty doctrine could encourage more heavy-
handed claims settlement practices by insurers, who may anticipate
the availability of a damages set-off should a bad faith case be litigated.
When the insured and the insurer have relatively equal bargaining
power, however, the doctrine of comparative bad faith and the equal
application between both insurer and insured of the good faith and
fair dealing standards seems fair. Rather than distinguish between in-
sureds who are able to bargain equally with insurers and those who
are not, the doctrine announced in California Casualty sends a warn-
ing to all insureds to deal with insurance companies with the same
good faith the companies are bound to employ. The California Casu-
alty court might instead have held that bad faith is such a serious
breach of an insurance contract that any bad faith of an insured should
entirely preclude recovery from an insurer for bad faith. This would
have unduly benefited insurers, however, and would have failed to
take into account the varying degrees of bad faith which may be
demonstrated by the conduct of the parties.
As a practical matter, comparative bad faith may come to be rou-
tinely pleaded by insurance companies in every bad faith case.'42 At-
tempts may be made to taint even innocuous behavior. Insurers may
be expected to be tempered in their pleadings, however, to avoid an
affront to the sensitivities of juries.""
CONCLUSION
The decision in California Casualty marks the first time any court
has accepted a pleading of comparative bad faith as an affirmative
defense to a bad faith claim by an insured. Although the decision
at first blush appears to come as a blow to consumers and as a sur-
prise in a state which many consider to be at the forefront of the
protection of consumer rights, comparative bad faith should not wreak
141. This heightened sense of concern was evident in the lament of one commentator, made
after Fletcher was decided, that "the time is past when the insurance industry was governed
primarily by the law of contracts." See Hilts, supra note 140, at 351. Cf. Levine, supra note
56, at 626 (absent the development of the tort theory of recovery, which allows for exemplary
awards, claims practices of insurers would likely be no less unconscionable than they were
before substantial punitive awards were first imposed).
142. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
143. Court OK's Comparative Bad Faith, supra note 20, at 10, col. 1. The lawyer for Califor-
nia Casualty quipped after announcement of the decision "With the way juries feel about in-
surance companies, no defense attorney in his right mind is going to assert [comparative bad
faith] at trial unless there's something to hang your hat on." Id.
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havoc on individual insureds. The court did not interpret an insured's
bad faith to be an absolute bar to recovery by the insured. Instead,
the court has announced an intention to balance equitably the com-
parative fault of the insured and the insurer, no insured can reasonably
object to paying a price for deplorable behavior toward an insurer.
In California Casualty, the insurance carrier alleged that the plaintiff
had used the same dilatory tactics for which the company was being
sued. California Casualty General Insurance Company accurately
perceived the law as imposing a good faith standard on both insurers
and insureds. The comparative bad faith approach employed by the
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District is fair to both
parties and should encourage them to deal fairly and in good faith
during the investigation and settlement of claims.
Matthew E. Karanian
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